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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed with the consent of both parties.  Matthew Sissel is a citizen
of Iowa who is the plaintiff in Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 1:10-cv-01263-RJL (D.D.C. filed July 26, 2010), a lawsuit pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, which challenges the
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
Mr. Sissel’s home state is one of several currently considering a Health Care Freedom
Act similar to the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act at issue in this case.1  Pacific
Legal Foundation (PLF) was founded more than 35 years ago and is widely
recognized as the largest and most experienced nonprofit legal foundation defending
private property rights, economic liberty, and limited government.  PLF attorneys
represent Matthew Sissel in his challenge to the PPACA.  Americans for Free Choice
in Medicine (AFCM) is a national nonprofit, nonpartisan, educational organization
based in Newport Beach, California, which was founded in 1993 to promote the
philosophy of individual rights, personal responsibility, and free-market economics
in the health care industry.  AFCM members include patients, Medicare recipients,
physicians, nurses, health care professionals, insurance industry professionals,
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pharmacists, and others.  PLF and AFCM appeared as amici curiae in the district
court in this case, and believe their legal and public policy expertise will assist this
Court in its consideration of this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici file this brief to respond specifically to the arguments regarding standing
advanced in the briefs of Amici Federal Jurisdiction Professors (Professors) and
Professor Kevin C. Walsh.  The Article III and statutory standing arguments
presented in these briefs are erroneous and the Court should reject them.
The Constitution reserves to the states a broad and indefinite residual
sovereignty, which includes such powers as taxation, regulation of hunting or of
alcohol consumption, and the power to run their own elections.  It also reserves to
states the power to articulate and defend rights that the Constitution does not
specifically delegate to federal protection.  U.S. Const. amend. X.  Just Maryland had
standing to challenge an allegedly ultra vires federal action that conflicted with the
state’s reserved power of taxation in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), and Missouri could challenge a federal act that intruded on its retained
authority to regulate hunting in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and South
Dakota could challenge federal actions that intruded on its constitutionally reserved
power to regulate alcohol consumption in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987),
- 3 -
so Virginia has standing to challenge the federal government’s interference with its
sovereign power to articulate and defend individual rights.
Although Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), barred states from
vindicating non-specific grievances against the federal government, the Court refused
to adopt a blanket prohibition on state lawsuits challenging federal overreaching.
Mellon’s declaration that the federal government is parens patriae with regard to
American citizens, id. at 486, is only true when the federal government is acting
within its enumerated powers; outside those boundaries, the federal government has
no authority, and it is states, not the federal government, that have primary
responsibility for protecting individual rights.  S. Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes Co.,
288 F.3d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 2002).  To hold otherwise would damage the constitu-
tional structure, and deprive states—which are well suited for the task—of the
opportunity to defend vital Tenth Amendment interests—interests which individuals
may lack standing to press.  See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 136-38 (3d Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010).  Neither Mellon nor any other case
supports the proposition that states have no sovereign interest “in protecting [their]
citizens from allegedly invalid federal laws.”  Professors Br. at 21.  Adopting such
a rule would be unwarranted and would encourage unconstitutional state resistance.
Finally, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983), does not bar statutory jurisdiction where, as here, the
- 4 -
resolution of a federal question is clearly at the heart of the case and plainly appears
on the face of the complaint.
ARGUMENT
I
STATES HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED
SOVEREIGN INTEREST IN ARTICULATING
AND DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF THEIR CITIZENS
The constitutional system of divided sovereignty makes the federal government
the supreme representative of the American people with regard to those specific
subjects delegated to the federal government.  The state governments exercise a
similar sovereignty over all matters not delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (states “‘form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective
spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within
its own sphere.’” (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961))); see also The Federalist No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“State Governments . . . clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before
had and which were not by [the Constitution] exclusively delegated to the United
States.”).
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Among a sovereign’s primary powers are the articulation and protection of
citizens’ rights through the enactment and enforcement of legislation.  The
Constitution leaves that responsibility to states, except in those specified instances
where such rights are given exclusive protection.  The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873) (“[B]eyond the very few express limitations which the
Federal Constitution imposed upon the States . . . the entire domain of the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the States . . . lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government.”).  Thus
while states lack power to act in a parens patriae capacity against the federal
government when the federal government is exercising an enumerated power, states
do have a distinct sovereign interest in protecting “residuary and inviolable
sovereignty.”  The Federalist No. 39, at 256 (James Madison).  That interest is
judicially cognizable.  Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242
(10th Cir. 2008) (“States have a legally protected sovereign interest in ‘the exercise
of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction. . . .
Federal regulatory action that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact to
satisfy this prong.” (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,
458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982))).
- 6 -
A. Federalism Exists to Protect the Rights of Citizens
and the Tenth Amendment Implicitly Incorporates
States’ Sovereign Interest in Defending Citizens’ Rights
The federalist system, as the Supreme Court has often reiterated, does not
protect state autonomy just for its own sake, but to ensure greater protection for
individual freedom.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).  The “power surrendered by the people” is divided
“between two distinct governments,” federal and state, so that “[t]he different
governments will control each other.”  The Federalist No. 51, at 351 (James
Madison). 
The authors of The Federalist repeatedly explained that state governments
would serve as a barrier against overreaching federal authority.  Seeking to allay
Anti-federalist fears that federal power would “introduce itself into every corner of
the city, and country . . . light upon the head of every person in the United States . . .
[and say to them]  GIVE!  GIVE!”  Brutus VI (1787), in 1 The Debate on the
Constitution 617 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993), Madison and his colleagues argued that
most power would be left at the state level, and that states would counteract any
tendency to aggrandize power in the distant federal government.  See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 17, at 107-08 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 32, at 200 (Alexander
Hamilton), No. 45, at 311-13 (James Madison).  Indeed, if the federal government
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were to “extend its power beyond the due limits,” states would have plentiful “means
of opposition,” including the people’s “refusal to co-operate with the officers of the
Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; [and] the embarrassments
created by legislative devices.”  The Federalist No. 46, at 319 (James Madison)
(emphasis added).  These legislative devices, would enable the “State Governments”
to “easily defeat[]” any “schemes of usurpation” that federal authorities might
undertake.  Id. at 322.
The Constitution limits federal authority primarily through the enumeration of
powers.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).  The Tenth Amendment
reiterates the device of enumerated powers by emphasizing that if a power is not
conferred to the federal government by the Constitution’s text, that power remains
with the states.  Just as the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as implicitly
incorporating into the Constitution the states’ preexisting sovereign immunity, Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), so the Tenth Amendment recognizes and
incorporates into the Constitution the states’ preexisting sovereign powers.  Alden,
527 U.S. at 715 (“[States] are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”).
Although this sovereignty is generally protected by the political process, Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985), courts since at least
2  The Virginia Constitution mandates that the state act, within its Tenth Amendment
power, to protect individual rights.  See Va. Const. art. I, §§ 2-3 (“[M]agistrates are
(continued...)
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McCulloch have also allowed states to defend their constitutionally recognized
sovereign authority by filing lawsuits challenging federal legislation.
The states’ residual sovereign authority includes the power to regulate for the
protection of public health, safety, and welfare.  Each state enjoys in this regard “the
same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction . . . as any foreign nation.”  New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837).  That jurisdiction includes “not only the
right, but the bounden and solemn duty . . . to advance the safety, happiness and
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act
of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive” to those ends, within
constitutional boundaries.  Id.  Thus each state has the residual sovereign authority
to, among other things, lay and collect taxes, McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 435,
regulate alcohol consumption, Dole, 483 U.S. at 205, regulate hunting within its
borders, Holland, 252 U.S. at 431, regulate the disposal of toxic waste, New York,
505 U.S. at 157, operate its elections, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970)
(opn. of Black, J.), and, as in this case, to “guard the rights of each individual
citizen,” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *48, by articulating, protecting, and
giving legal force to those rights.2
2 (...continued)
[the people’s] trustees and servants. . . .  [G]overnment is . . . instituted for the
common benefit, protection, and security of the people.”).
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Where states enjoy a constitutionally recognized sovereign authority—whether
it be taxation, the regulation of alcohol consumption, or the articulation and
enforcement of individual rights—they have a concrete sovereign interest with which
the federal government may not interfere except pursuant to an enumerated power.
Unconstitutional restrictions on this sovereignty are concrete and particularized
injuries to the states, which is all that Article III demands.  Wyoming, 539 F.3d
at 1242.  It was on this basis that states were found to have standing to challenge
federal laws that interfered with their constitutionally recognized residual sovereignty
in McCulloch, Dole, New York, Mitchell, Holland, and other cases.  Indeed, the
states’ sovereign authority to operate their own legal systems has virtually always
been considered a sufficient interest to allow states to sue the federal government.
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601 (States have judicially cognizable interest
in “the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant
jurisdiction—this involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil
and criminal.”).
In McCulloch, Maryland passed a statute taxing the national bank probably
only as a basis for challenging its constitutionality—for what Amici in this case call
3 Indeed, several states passed taxes or laws prohibiting the bank’s operations for this
purpose, 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 505-06
(1922), not unlike the Health Care Freedom Acts enacted in several states in recent
years.  Health Care Freedom Acts have been enacted in Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Lousiana, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah.  See American
Legislative Exchange Council, Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act, available at
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FOCA&Template=/CM/HTMLD
isplay.cfm&ContentID=15323 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
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“no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest other than to provoke a conflict with federal
law.”  Professors Br. at 25; see 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 329 (argument of Mr. Webster)
(“This is . . . an attempt to expel the bank from the State.”).3  The plaintiff sued both
on his own behalf and as a representative of the state, see id. at 317 (identifying the
defendant in error as “a sovereign state”), to challenge the constitutionality of the
bank as exceeding Congress’ powers and intruding on the states’ retained sovereign
authority.  The Court never doubted that Maryland had Article III standing; instead,
it decided the case on the merits.  Since then, no commentator ever appears to have
doubted that Maryland had standing.
There is little difference between Maryland’s enactment of a tax law to
challenge the constitutionality of what it considered an ultra vires federal act and the
Virginia statute that here guarantees citizens the freedom from compulsory purchases.
The power to tax and the power to articulate and defend specific individual rights are
both inherent powers of sovereignty, and the only rights which the state is without
power to identify and enforce are those which are conferred to exclusive federal
- 11 -
protection.  In other words, while Amici Professors are correct that states have no
justiciable interest in protecting citizens from valid federal laws, which are the
supreme law of the land, the Constitution does reserve to the states a judicially
cognizable interest in protecting citizens against invalid federal laws.
In Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124, and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
325 (1966), the Supreme Court found that states had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act because the Constitution “preserve[s] to the
States the power . . . to establish and maintain their own separate and independent
governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself commands otherwise.”
Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124 (opn. of Black, J.).  In Dole, South Dakota had standing to
seek declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of a federal law that the state alleged
intruded on “the ‘core powers’ reserved to the States under § 2 of the [Twenty-First]
Amendment.”  483 U.S. at 205.  In New York, the state could challenge the
constitutionality of a federal law that intruded on its sovereign power to regulate
nuclear waste.  New York, 505 U.S. at 157.  These cases stand for the proposition that
states have standing to sue the federal government to defend those sovereign powers
that the Constitution recognizes as their own.  There is no principled distinction
between these constitutionally recognized sovereign interests and the constitutionally
recognized sovereign interest in articulating and defending individual
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rights—between powers retained by the Twenty-First Amendment and powers
retained by the Tenth.
Sovereignty includes an interest not only in articulating but in acting to enforce
the rights of the citizen.  See John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government,
§ 159, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 421 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed.
1963) (1690) (“[T]he Executor of the Laws having the power in his hands, has by the
common Law of Nature, a right to make use of it, for the good of the Society.”); id.
§ 143, in id. at 409-10 (“The Legislative Power is that which has a right to direct how
the Force of the Commonwealth shall be imploy’d for preserving the Community and
the Members of it.”).  The Tenth Amendment entrusts this sovereign function
primarily to states; it is thus no less a constitutionally protected interest than were the
sovereign interests which entitled states to sue in cases like Katzenbach, Mitchell,
Dole, and other cases.
Nothing in Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, or Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
258 U.S. 158 (1922), bars states from filing suit to defend their use of constitutionally
recognized residual sovereignty.  In Mellon, the Court rejected a parens patriae suit
brought by a state challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute, because “in
respect of their relations with the Federal Government,” it is the federal government,
and not states, which represent Americans as parens patriae.  Id. at 486.  But the
Court emphasized that it was not creating a rule barring states from challenging the
4 Indeed, Mellon is better understood as a political question decision than a true
standing decision.  As Professor Currie noted, Mellon perpetuated “confusion
between political questions and standing” by “denying a state standing” while
simultaneously “declar[ing] that the ‘question, as it is thus presented, is political and
not judicial in character.’ ”  David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
The First Hundred Years 1789-1888 at 304 n.121 (1985) (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S.
at 483 (emphasis Currie’s)).  Under Mellon, states certainly “ha[ve] no standing to
assert merely political interests,” id. at 304, but neither does any other party.  Even
reading Mellon as a true standing case, however, it adopts a prudential standing rule
intended to “protecting the powers of the federal government vis-a-vis the states.”
Maryland People’s Counsel v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 760 F.2d 318, 321
(D.C. Cir. 1985).  But the only powers the federal government has vis-a-vis the states
are enumerated powers.  Where a federal statute exceeds those enumerated powers,
there is no constitutional warrant for denying judicial remedy for the state’s actual
injury.
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constitutionality of federal laws.  See id. at 485 (“We need not go so far as to say that
a State may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens against any form of
enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress.”).
Moreover, Massachusetts had not exercised its sovereign power to articulate
or enforce a particular right that was being violated by the challenged federal statute.
Instead, Massachusetts sought determination only of an abstract political question:4
“[W]e are called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not rights of
dominion over physical domain, not quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or
threatened, but abstract questions of political power, of sovereignty, of government.”
Id. at 484-85.  See also id. at 488 (Courts can only review the constitutionality of
federal laws when a state alleges “some direct injury suffered or threatened,
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presenting a justiciable issue,” and “not merely” when the state “suffers in some
indefinite way.”).
The Court dismissed Texas for the same reason.  It did not hold that states
always lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal laws; instead, the
Court dismissed the case because the poorly drafted complaint was primarily devoted
to “an abstract question of legislative power” instead of “a case or controversy.”
258 U.S. at 162.  Courts may adjudicate such questions “only where rights, in
themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be,
affected prejudicially by the application or enforcement of a statute.”  Id.
Mellon and Texas thus differ from a case like this, in which the state has
actually exercised its sovereign authority to articulate and to enforce a particular
individual right.  See also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
The Second Century 1888-1986 at 185 (1990) (“[S]ince the state’s alleged right to sue
[in Mellon] was based upon representation of its citizens, it could sue only to enforce
their rights, and no one had identified any citizen whose rights the federal law
infringed.”).  Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act does not merely declare some
generalized grievance, or seek judicial resolution of an abstract political question.
Rather, that Act concretizes a specific citizen right as a matter of state law, as a step
in the actual enforcement of that right; it is a specific exercise of Virginia’s
constitutionally retained sovereign power.
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This approach is buttressed by Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007),
where the Court emphasized the difference between a judicially cognizable sovereign
interest and the sort of non-specific grievance that the Mellon Court found
insufficient:
The Chief Justice claims that we “overloo[k] the fact that our cases cast
significant doubt on a State’s standing to assert a quasi-sovereign
interest . . . against the Federal Government.”  Not so.  Mellon itself
disavowed any such broad reading when it noted that the Court had been
“called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not rights of
dominion over physical domain, [and] not quasi sovereign rights
actually invaded or threatened”. . . .  Massachusetts does not here
dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to
assert its rights under the Act.
Id. at 520 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
The “rights under the Act” were sufficient to confer standing in that case
because those rights were recognized by federal statute, id. at 517 (“the right to
challenge agency action unlawfully withheld”), and the interest at issue was a
sovereign interest, id. at 519 (“Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its
sovereign territory.”).  In the same way, Virginia’s right to articulate and protect
individual rights that are not conferred to federal authority is recognized by the
Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. X, and the interest at issue is a well-founded desire
to preserve its sovereign authority over rights that are left to the states for protection.
That is a constitutionally founded sovereign interest no less than were the interests
that sufficed in McCulloch, Mitchell, Dole, New York, and other cases.  And because
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Virginia has actually exercised that power by enacting a statute that articulates and
concretizes an individual right, this case differs from the general political grievance
at issue in Mellon.  The Virginia Health Care Freedom Act—or, more precisely,
Virginia’s authority to enact and enforce such a law—is a constitutionally recognized
sovereign power.  At the same time, that act makes the individual right at issue
specific enough to be the subject of adjudication, rather than an abstract political
question.
B. A State’s Sovereign Interest in Protecting
Individual Rights Is Distinct From the Individual’s
Interest in Those Rights and Is Not a Political Question
To understand Virginia’s sovereign interest clearly, one must distinguish it
from a third-party claim in which a plaintiff seeks to defend the rights of another.
Virginia cannot merely represent an individual citizens’ private interests.  Oregon v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Oregon does not have
standing to bring suit on behalf of . . . private parties.”).  But it does have sovereign
authority to define the contours and mechanics of its citizens’ rights or entitlements,
within the boundaries of the federal Constitution.  States have a sovereign interest in
creating, for example, a property recordation system, or defining the state’s property
law, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998), or managing transfer-
payment entitlements.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492 (1999).  These interests are
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distinct from a citizen’s private interest in the particular property or entitlement
involved.
As noted above, the Supreme Court in McCulloch never denied that Maryland
had sovereign authority to tax activities within its boundaries, or that it could seek to
vindicate that authority by challenging the constitutionality of a federal law that
interfered with its statute.  Likewise, in Holland, the Court found that the state had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a treaty regulating birds, because under
that treaty, the federal government would “invade the sovereign right of the State and
contravene its . . . statutes.”  252 U.S. at 431.  The Court did reject the state’s
argument that it had proprietary standing, because it owned the birds in fee.  See id.
at 434 (“To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed.”).  But
it did not question the state’s standing to assert sovereign regulatory interests and on
that basis to challenge the treaty’s constitutionality.  Instead, it proceeded to the
merits.  Id. at 434-35.
In New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926), by contrast, the Court found
that New Jersey lacked standing to challenge a federal water regulation that would
interfere with the state’s sovereign authority over its waterways.  But like Mellon,
Sargent rejected standing because of the abstract nature of the question presented, not
because of any absence of cognizable sovereign interests.  Indeed, Sargent
acknowledged that the state had such interests, but rejected standing because the state
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was not actually “engaged or about to engage in any work or operations which the
[federal] Act purports to prohibit or restrict.”  Id. at 338.  New Jersey was not
employing its sovereign power:  “There is no showing that it has determined on or is
about to proceed with any definite project . . . [or is] now taking or about to take any
definite action respecting waters bordering on or within the State.”  Id. at 339.
Although New Jersey argued that the federal law “pass[ed] beyond the field of
congressional power and invad[ed] that reserved to the State,” the Court lacked power
to adjudicate the validity of the law “until [the state’s sovereign interests] are given
or are about to be given some practical application and effect.”  Id. (emphasis
added).
Here, by contrast, Virginia has acted pursuant to its sovereign interest.  It has
not merely declared its disagreement with the federal law or stated an individual right
in precatory terms; rather, it has clearly defined an individual right and devoted its
administrative resources to defending that right.  Unlike in Sargent, the state is
employing its constitutionally retained sovereignty in a specific way.  Virginia is
therefore seeking to adjudicate a specific, cognizable injury instead of an abstract
political dispute.
Indeed, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), cited both Sargent and Mellon as
standing not for the proposition that states are barred from suing to defend their
sovereign interests in protecting citizens from unconstitutional federal laws, but as
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examples of the judiciary’s unwillingness to adjudicate “‘abstract questions of
political power.’”  Id. at 286 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485).  As Baker explained,
federal courts rejected standing in such cases because the parties did not
claim infringement of an interest particular and personal to himself, as
distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction with the general frame and
functioning of government—a complaint that the political institutions
are awry.  What renders cases of this kind non-justiciable is not
necessarily the nature of the parties to them . . . nor is it the nature of
the legal question involved, for the same type of question has been
adjudicated when presented in other forms of controversy.  The crux of
the matter is that courts are not fit instruments of decision where what
is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests of
policy.
Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
The Baker Court summed up “the gist of the question of standing” as whether
the plaintiff has “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of [the] issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination.”  Id. at 204.  That standard is easily
satisfied here.  Virginia has exercised its sovereignty in a specific way, articulating
a clearly defined individual right of its citizens, and putting state resources into the
actual enforcement of that right.  The federal government is depriving Virginia of that
sovereign authority under a statute that goes beyond the Constitution’s enumeration
of powers.  The issues are sufficiently sharpened and the parties sufficiently adverse
to permit adjudication.  This case has none of the abstract generality that led to the
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Court’s dismissal of Mellon, Texas, and Sargent.  Given that the Constitution was
written with the express intention that states serve a role in protecting both individual
rights and their own autonomy against federal intrusion, there is no logical reason to
deny Virginia standing to litigate this case.
C. States Are Uniquely Positioned to Litigate
Tenth Amendment Violations, and Courts Should
Interpret Standing Flexibly to Allow Them to Do So
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950), the
Supreme Court warned that questions of standing should not be the basis for
indulging in “formalism or sterile technicality.”  In short, Article III standing
requirements should be read in context.  As Professor Currie observed, restricting
standing too severely would render constitutional protections and prohibitions
ineffectual, and while “this argument cannot justify judicial action in the absence of
the case or controversy the Constitution requires . . . it may help in determining just
what a case or controversy is.”  Currie, Second Century, supra, at 185.
States have a unique interest in Tenth Amendment questions for three reasons.
First, individual citizens may lack standing to raise Tenth Amendment challenges.
See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939).  The Supreme Court
will decide that question this term.  See Bond, 581 F.3d at 136-38, cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 455.  But if it is true that “[o]nly states have standing to pursue claims
alleging violations of the Tenth Amendment by the federal government,” Oregon,
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552 F.3d at 972 (emphasis added), then they should have some viable means of doing
so.  The Supreme Court has already found that states may challenge the
constitutionality of federal laws that intrude on constitutionally retained sovereign
authority.  If states have standing to defend sovereign powers retained by, say, the
Twenty-First Amendment, there is no reason to deny them power to challenge statutes
that intrude on other sovereign functions reserved by the Tenth Amendment.
Second, states have strong incentives to enforce the Tenth Amendment and to
ensure a fair adjudication of federalism issues.  If the “gist of the question of
standing” is whether a party has sufficient interest at stake to “assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of [the] issues,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 204,
then there is no reason to deny states standing to present Tenth Amendment issues
crucial to them.  Since at least the days of McCulloch, states have used their
legislative power to challenge allegedly unconstitutional statutes and sharpen
controversies into viable lawsuits.  See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State
Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387, 420 (1995) (States often “adopt[ed] and enforce[d]
laws that conflicted with federal laws to test indirectly whether the federal
government exceeded its powers.”).
Finally, the Tenth Amendment was written to help prevent the federal
government from assuming powers not delegated to it; as part of what Professor
Amar has called states’ “special role and responsibility in protecting their constituents
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from federal lawlessness.”  Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1517 (1987).  As the Supreme Court wrote in Gregory, 501 U.S.
at 458, the founders balanced power between states and the federal government “to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power” and “reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.”
Given that states have a special interest in enforcing the Tenth Amendment,
and adequate incentives to see that the Amendment is enforced, and the fact that state
sovereignty was designed into the constitutional system to help keep the federal
government within its limits “[i]n part by mutual jealousy and monitoring,” Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 123 (1998), there is no reason to resist allowing
Virginia to seek redress for the concrete and particular injury that PPACA inflicts on
its residual sovereign authority.
On the contrary, to deny states this power would risk upsetting the federal
constitutional balance.  The Amici argue that “[t]he state’s interest in enforcing its
legal code must necessarily give way to federal law whenever a conflict arises,”
Professors Br. at 22 (emphasis added), even if those federal statutes are
unconstitutional.  This extreme proposition is not be supported by precedent.  If
adopted, such a rule would hamper Virginia’s ability to vindicate its constitutionally
guaranteed residual sovereignty, would tend to insulate unconstitutional federal
statutes from challenge, and would damage the states’ role as restraints on federal
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overreaching.  Under that approach, the state of Maryland could not have challenged
the constitutionality of the national bank in McCulloch, South Dakota could not have
challenged the constitutionality of the statute in Dole, and South Carolina would have
been barred from challenging the Voting Rights Act in Katzenbach.  Suffice to say
Article III imposes no such rule.  States’ authority to enforce their legal codes must
give way to federal law only where those federal laws are within Congress’
enumerated powers.  Where a federal law inflicts a concrete and particularized injury
on a state—by conflicting with an actual statute that articulates and protects a right
which the Constitution leaves to the states—the state has standing to defend its
sovereign interest in court.
D. Allowing States to Sue on These Grounds
Is a Viable Alternative to “Nullification”
Amici are right to bemoan the recent resurgence of “nullification” rhetoric.
Professors Br. at 30-31.  There can be no dispute that “nullification” is
unconstitutional, and that no state has power to absolve citizens of the obligation to
obey federal statutes.  See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 115, 136
(1809); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 923-27 (E.D. La. 1960),
aff’d 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (per curiam).  But Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act is
not an attempt to “nullify” federal law.  On the contrary, it represents a
constitutionally legitimate alternative to nullification, because Virginia is merely
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seeking a determination of a constitutional question within the federal judicial system.
As Professor Amar has warned, it is important that while “discarding the extremism
of nullification” we do not also “throw[] away a rich antebellum tradition
emphasizing state protection of constitutional norms against the federal government.”
Amar, Sovereignty, supra, at 1517.
James Madison, who is often credited along with Thomas Jefferson with
devising the “nullification” doctrine, denied that attribution while thoroughly
explaining why states lack authority simply to void federal statutes.  See Drew R.
McCoy, The Last of the Fathers:  James Madison and the Republican Legacy 119-70
(1989); see further James Madison, Notes on Nullification, in 9 The Writings of
James Madison:  1819-1836 at 573-607 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); James Madison,
Letter to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in id. at 383-403.  He acknowledged that
federal courts were the appropriate fora for resolving disputes between states and the
federal government as to the proper scope of federal authority.  Id. at 397; see also
James Madison, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 7, 1829), in id. at 351 (“[T]here is
& must be an Arbiter or Umpire in the constitutional authority provided for deciding
questions concerning the boundaries of right & power.  The particular provision, in
the Constitution of the U.S. is in the authority of the Supreme Court.”).  But if it is
proper for states to seek federal judicial resolution of the “boundaries of right and
power” between their own sovereign authority and that of the federal government,
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then there is no reason to deny states the opportunity to seek such determinations by
enacting statutes that articulate and protect rights that the state believes are violated
by an unconstitutional federal law.  For a state to seek a judicial remedy within the
federal system is an appropriate recognition of the state’s relationship to the federal
government:  accepting the federal Supreme Court as the highest constitutional
authority for interpreting federal laws, while protecting their own constitutionally
recognized sovereign powers.
Moreover, denying states the ability to seek judicial determinations of these
questions is likely to encourage further attempts at “nullification.”  The theory of
“nullification” rests on the presumption that federal courts will not fairly adjudicate
disputes between states and the federal government.  See, e.g., Thomas E. Woods, Jr.,
Nullification:  How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century 6 (2010).  If states
are denied the ability to seek federal judicial resolution of questions of this sort, they
are more likely to attempt “nullification” or other unconstitutional alternatives.
Indeed, as Madison observed in The Federalist No. 39, at 256, federal courts must
adjudicate “controversies relating to the boundary between” the states and the federal
government “impartially . . . according to the rules of the Constitution. . . .  Some
such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution
of the compact.”
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Chief Justice Taney reiterated this point in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.
(2 Wall.) 697, 700-01 (1865).  The Constitution gave the federal judiciary its
“unusual power[s]” because under the Constitution, “two separate governments
exercise certain powers of sovereignty over the same territory, each independent of
the other within its appropriate sphere of action.”  Thus there is “an absolute
necessity, in order to preserve internal tranquillity, that there should be some tribunal
to decide between the Government of the United States and the government of a State
whenever any controversy should arise as to their relative and respective powers.”
Denying states standing to obtain a fair judicial review of the constitutionality
of a federal statute that interferes with what the state contends falls within its
constitutionally recognized residual sovereignty will only increase conflict and
encourage states to resort to unconstitutional alternatives.
II
FRANCHISE TAX BD. DOES NOT BAR THIS CASE
Amicus Professor Walsh contends that, Article III concerns aside, the Court
lacks statutory subject matter jurisdiction under Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 21-22.
But this argument is ultimately unconvincing.
First, Franchise Tax was an application of the “well-pleaded complaint rule,”
id. at 10 n.9, which held that federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on the mere
possibility that a defendant might raise a federal question in defense.  The case
- 27 -
essentially reiterated the rule that federal question jurisdiction exists only where the
plaintiff’s complaint presents a federal question “‘unaided by anything alleged in
anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may
interpose.’”  Id. at 10 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
Federal courts cannot take jurisdiction over cases based on the mere “‘suggestion of
one party, that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of
the United States.’”  Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 672 (quoting Tennessee v. Union &
Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894)).  In Franchise Tax, California sought the
enforcement of a lien which the defendant believed was preempted by ERISA.  This
anticipated defense was the sole basis for federal jurisdiction.  The question was not
“ ‘really’ one of federal law,” 463 U.S. at 13, because state law established the rules
“without reference to federal law, under which a tax levy may be enforced,” and
federal law was relevant “only by way of a defense to an obligation created entirely
by state law, and then only if appellant has made out a valid claim for relief under
state law.”  Id.
This case, by contrast, lacks any such hypothetical or contingent factors.  It is
really one of federal law; the only question is whether Congress has constitutional
authority to deprive the state of the residual sovereignty which entitles it to enact laws
like the Health Care Freedom Act.  This case requires no resolution of state law
issues, and federal law is not solely relevant as a defense.  As the Franchise Tax
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Court recognized, “even though state law creates [a party’s] causes of action, its case
might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint
established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.”  Id. at 13.  In other words, when the plaintiff’s “right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” id.
at 28, federal courts have jurisdiction.  That is obviously the case here.
Second, Franchise Tax did not adopt a formalistic, blanket denial of state
standing to seek judicial determinations of the constitutionality of federal laws.
Indeed, the Court emphasized the importance of reading federal declaratory judgment
jurisdiction with an eye to “practicality and necessity” and a “ ‘common-sense
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations.’ ”  463 U.S. at 20 (quoting
Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936)).  See also Skelly Oil,
339 U.S. at 673 (counseling against “formalism or sterile technicality”).
Here, practical considerations counsel in favor of jurisdiction.  One major
reason for the Franchise Tax decision was that the state could expect its arguments
to be raised by private parties in their own lawsuits.  463 U.S. at 21 (“States are not
significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court for a declaratory
judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a person subject to federal
regulation.”).  But that is not the case here, given that states may lack standing to
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raise Tenth Amendment arguments.  Bond, 581 F.3d at 136-38.  Thus, Virginia would
be significantly prejudiced by the inability to seek declaratory judgment.
Finally, Franchise Tax did not bar federal jurisdiction in other cases seeking
declaratory judgment as to the validity of federal laws that allegedly exceeded
constitutional authority and intruded on residual state power.  Dole, for example, was
a declaratory relief action challenging a federal statute that the state believed intruded
on its constitutionally recognized authority to regulate alcohol.  483 U.S. at 205.
New York v. United States of America was also a suit for declaratory relief
challenging a federal statute that interfered with the state’s authority to make and
enforce its own statutes.  See 942 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1991).
In short, Franchise Tax and the well-pled complaint rule in general are not
formalistic prohibitions against state standing in challenging the constitutionality of
federal statutes.  Instead, they require only that the resolution of a federal question be
plainly required by the complaint.  That is obviously the case here.
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CONCLUSION
The state of Virginia has standing to pursue this case.
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